

SolarChain-Eval: A Physics-Constrained Benchmark for Trustworthy Economic Agents in Decentralized Energy Markets

Shilin Ou^{†§}
Duke Kunshan University
Suzhou, China

Yifan Xu[†]
Duke Kunshan University
Suzhou, China

Luyao Zhang^{§*}
Duke Kunshan University
Suzhou, China




Figure 1: Overall *SolarChain-Eval* benchmark pipeline. The figure summarizes the end-to-end workflow from data loading, RL training, policy evaluation, output generation, and trustworthiness evidence for decentralized energy-market governance.

Abstract

As agentic AI systems are increasingly applied to cyber-physical environments, their evaluation requires assessment of both task performance and trustworthiness. In decentralized energy markets, autonomous agents may improve market utility, but may also exploit invalid physical data, create artificial liquidity, and produce unstable governance decisions. Therefore, we propose *SolarChain-Eval*, a physics-constrained benchmark for evaluating trustworthy economic agents. It formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process, where agents make hourly decisions. *SolarChain-Eval* evaluates each policy across multiple dimensions, including market utility, physical safety, slippage, action smoothness, spatial fairness, and auditability.

To support agentic evaluation, *SolarChain-Eval* incorporates an LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer. The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions. All interventions are recorded through structured logs, including trigger signals, proposed actions, revised actions, and audit rationales. Experiments with static, random, myopic, RL, and RL+LLM policies reveal a clear utility-safety trade-off.

RL agents improve market utility but can still produce unsafe behavior. When the physics penalty is removed, reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and increase artificial liquidity. The LLM Planner/Auditor improves auditability and mitigates selected risks, but it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified reward function. These results indicate that trustworthy agentic AI evaluation requires both physical constraints and transparent intervention traces. We release data and code as open access on GitHub for replicability.

Keywords

Agentic AI, reinforcement learning, trustworthiness evaluation, tokenomics, decentralized energy markets

1 Introduction

Agentic AI is increasingly used to support autonomous decision-making in cyber-physical and economic systems[30]. Such agents not only optimize digital objectives, their actions may also affect physical resources, market incentives, and systems safety[29]. This shift raises an evaluation challenge that agent performance cannot be judged by scalar reward alone. Trustworthy agents should therefore make decisions that are physically grounded, constraint-aware, and auditable under real-world operating conditions [7, 20, 22].

In decentralized energy markets, reinforcement learning (RL) has been used to manage market liquidity, token issuance, and incentive distribution [21, 27]. However, unlike purely digital environments,

[†]Equal contribution.

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^{*}The Corresponding author: Email: lz183@duke.edu, Digital Innovation Research Center and Social Science Division, Duke Kunshan University, Address: Duke Avenue No.8, Kunshan, Suzhou, Jiangsu, China, 215316.

Table 1: Comparison of Prevailing Bi-Level Architectures Integrating RL and LLM Agents

Framework	Domain	Synergy Mechanism (LLM + RL)	Limitations & Challenges
RE-GoT [34]	Robotic Control & Manipulation	Upper-level LLM uses Graph-of-Thoughts to evolve reward functions; Vision models analyze RL rollouts for semantic feedback.	High latency due to LLM/VLM inference bottlenecks in real-time control loops.
RL ² [33]	Active Distribution Networks	LLM translates operator safety intents into mathematical penalties; adapts parameters via DRL feedback.	Sensitive to LLM hallucination during algebraic adjustments.
ADMM-LLM [32]	Microgrid Heat-Electricity	LLM acts as an optimizer that observes optimization residuals to predict and adjust decentralized ADMM penalty parameters.	Heuristic trial-and-error lacks strict mathematical convergence guarantees.

energy markets are bounded by physical laws, such as localized solar irradiance and photovoltaic panel capacities [18, 36]. Deploying reward-maximizing agents in such environments therefore creates important trustworthiness risks. Without explicit physical constraints, RL models can learn to exploit weaknesses in the market mechanism [1].

To address this, we propose *SolarChain-Eval*, a physics-constrained benchmark for evaluating trustworthy agentic AI in decentralized energy markets. *SolarChain-Eval* combines solar signals with controlled market and risk scenarios, and formulates market governance as a Gymnasium-compatible Markov Decision Process. To further examine agentic oversight, *SolarChain-Eval* incorporates an evaluation-time LLM-based Planner/Auditor layer, which is inserted between the trained RL policy and the benchmark environment without being used during RL training. The Planner defines episode-level action bounds and audit rules, while the Auditor reviews and revises high-risk actions. This design enables *SolarChain-Eval* to assess both the operational performance of an RL policy, and the extent to which its decision-making behavior remains governable and interpretable.

Specifically, we concentrate on the following research questions:

- **RQ1:** How do autonomous market policies trade off economic utility, physical safety, stability, and fairness compared with static and heuristic baselines?
- **RQ2:** To what extent do reward-maximizing agents exploit invalid generation and create artificial liquidity when physics penalties are removed?
- **RQ3:** How does an LLM-based Planner/Auditor contribute to auditable risk mitigation for trained RL policies, and what are its limitations under reward misspecification?

Data and Code Availability Statements: We release data and code as open access on GitHub¹ for replicability.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Reinforcement Learning in Tokenomics

Traditional economic mechanisms struggle when applied to decentralized energy markets due to the restrictive assumptions of stationary environments [37]. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are

governed by intermittent generation constraints and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network topologies [5]. However, tokenomic mechanisms are subject to extreme volatility driven by liquidity depth, speculative token price trajectories, and adoption rates [6, 17]. RL provides a flexible modeling approach by formulating market governance as a Markov Decision Process [37]. It can adapt to high-dimensional state spaces, optimizing long-term objectives that balance physical utility with economic stability [37].

In current decentralized market governance literature [23, 31], macroeconomic control is typically abstracted into continuous governance levers, such as the reward ratio (r_t), liquidity ratio (l_t), and token burn rate (b_t). In simulated environments, the normalized action vector a_t is decoded into specific economic parameters. To evaluate system trustworthiness, researchers widely rely on standardized frameworks like *Stable-Baselines3* [24] to benchmark distinct RL algorithmic paradigms:

Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is an on-policy actor-critic algorithm widely applied to continuous action space governance tasks. To prevent excessively large policy updates, PPO utilizes a clipped surrogate objective [26]:

$$L^{CLIP}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\min(p_t(\theta) \hat{A}_t, \text{clip}(p_t(\theta), 1 - \epsilon, 1 + \epsilon) \hat{A}_t) \right] \quad (1)$$

where θ denotes the policy network parameters, $p_t(\theta)$ is the probability ratio, $\hat{A}_t$ represents the estimated advantage function, and ϵ is the clipping hyperparameter.

In tokenomic governance, this high training stability translates to practical advantages by effectively suppressing action jitter and ensuring smoother adjustments of macroeconomic parameters.

Also supporting continuous control, Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) is an off-policy algorithm. By incorporating a maximum entropy mechanism into its objective function [11], SAC proactively encourages the agent to explore diverse tokenomic strategies:

$$J(\pi) = \sum_{t=0}^T \mathbb{E}_{(s_t, a_t) \sim \rho_\pi} [r(s_t, a_t) + \alpha \mathcal{H}(\pi(\cdot|s_t))] \quad (2)$$

where $r(s_t, a_t)$ denotes the immediate reward, α is the temperature parameter, and $\mathcal{H}(\pi(\cdot|s_t))$ represents the entropy of the policy π at state s_t .

¹<https://github.com/yxu-dev/SolarChain-Eval>

Existing research demonstrates that this mechanism not only improves sample efficiency but also prevents the policy from prematurely converging to suboptimal local minima in highly nonlinear market environments[3].

As a robust value-based baseline algorithm, Deep Q-Network (DQN) is applied to discrete action spaces. In multidimensional control tasks, continuous levers are typically discretized. Despite inherent quantization errors, DQN excels at accurately estimating the action-value function $Q(s, a)$ [19, 28].

2.2 RL & LLM Agent Integration

RL has shown strong performance in high-dimensional continuous control tasks. However, its black-box nature limits its reliability in infrastructure [2]. In practice, human auditors may find it difficult to explain why an RL policy makes adjustments [25]. Furthermore, while post-hoc AI methods offer retrospective insights, they cannot proactively prevent unsafe actions[10].

Recent studies address this by integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) with RL systems. LLMs could act as high-level reasoners to process task context and operator instructions [35]. This ability allows them to translate operator intents into mathematical penalties that can support lower-level decision making [8].

Consequently, current research is shifting toward a bi-level RL-LLM architecture [4]. The lower layer uses RL policies to make frequent control decisions based on value estimates such as $V(s)$ or $Q(s, a)$. The upper layer uses LLMs for slower and more abstract reasoning tasks. Prior work has used LLMs to convert operator intent into reward penalties [13], revise reward functions, and tune optimization parameters [16]. Table 1 summarizes representative examples of this design.

Recent advances in RL have improved agent-based optimization in Cyber-Physical Systems, especially in decentralized energy markets [12, 15]. As the focus shifts toward real-world deployment [9], there is a growing need to complement traditional reward-centric benchmarks with evaluations of trustworthiness. Specifically, ensuring safe operation requires assessing an agent’s adherence to physical constraints and its resilience in adversarial scenarios [14]. Following this view, our benchmark couples economic dynamics with physical ground truths and evaluates agentic trustworthiness across multiple dimensions.

3 Methodology

Instead of merely maximizing short-term trading volume, our benchmark evaluates the overall trustworthiness of an autonomous economic agent. It assesses whether the agent can maintain market utility while respecting physical limits, ensuring market stability, reducing action jitter, and preserving spatial fairness. Each episode represents a 24 hour market cycle, sampled from a 720-hour dataset from April 2026. Episodes are constrained to start at the beginning of the day. This temporal design ensures a consistent daily decision horizon for the agent while preserving real-world weather patterns.

3.1 RL Formulation

Figure 2 summarizes the RL loop. Energy generation, market demand, and physics labels are aggregated into an hourly benchmark state. Based on this state, a policy proposes a governance action.

The state s_t and action a_t are defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} s_t &= [\sin \tau_t, \cos \tau_t, G_t^v, G_t^r, P_t^{\max}, \Delta_t, L_t, p_t, v_t, \sigma_t, \alpha_{t-1}, \ell_{t-1}], \\ a_t &= (\alpha_t, \ell_t, b_t), \quad \alpha_t + \ell_t \leq 0.98. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Here, τ_t is the time angle, G_t^v is verified generation, G_t^r is reported generation, $P_t^{\max}$ is the physical PV upper bound, Δ_t is the supply-demand gap, L_t is market liquidity, p_t is token price, v_t is the raw risk signal, and σ_t is the static slippage.

The action a_t comprises the reward allocation ratio α_t , liquidity injection ratio ℓ_t , and token burn rate b_t . Standard algorithms like PPO and SAC operate on the continuous action space, while DQN utilizes a discretized $5^3 = 125$ action grid over the same parameters. All trained policies are evaluated under the uniform benchmark setting detailed in Table 2.

Table 2: Main benchmark configuration.

Item	Value
Cities	Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenzhen, Hangzhou
Energy nodes	50
Main period	2026-04-01 to 2026-04-30
Hourly market states	720
Generation records	36,000
P2P trade records	1,185
Episode length	24 hours
Evaluated Policies	Static, Random, Myopic, PPO, SAC, DQN

3.2 Physics Limit and Market Transition

SolarChain-Eval implements a physics constraint module, which verifies whether reported generation is physically feasible and FDIA labels. Let X_t denote suspicious or invalid supply. The benchmark not only records this anomaly but quantifies the extent to which the policy economically backs it:

$$V_t = \frac{\beta_t X_t}{\max(G_t^v + \beta_t X_t, \epsilon)}, \quad \beta_t = \frac{\min(\alpha_t + \ell_t, 0.98)}{0.98}. \quad (4)$$

In Eq. (4), V_t is the action-dependent physics violation term. A policy incurs higher risk when it heavily backs invalid supply. This formulation directly addresses RQ2: through a no-physics-penalty ablation, we can observe whether a purely reward-driven agent exploits invalid generation to inflate artificial liquidity.

Additionally, the market module processes the backed supply, consisting of verified supply and the action-backed suspicious supply. It updates the matched energy M_t and computes the residual liquidity L_{t+1} for the next hour:

$$\begin{aligned} M_t &= \min(L_t + \ell_t(G_t^v + \beta_t X_t), \tilde{Q}_t), \\ L_{t+1} &= \max(L_t + \ell_t(G_t^v + \beta_t X_t) - M_t, 0). \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Here, $\tilde{Q}_t$ represents the effective demand after token burning, computed as

$$\tilde{Q}_t = Q_t^d \max(0.75, 1 - 0.80b_t),$$

where Q_t^d is the raw market demand. This mechanism explicitly links the agent’s governance decisions to both trading volume and market liquidity depth.




Figure 2: Reinforcement learning evaluation framework for SolarChain-Eval. The diagram connects market and physical inputs to policy actions, environment feedback, PPO/SAC/DQN updates, and trustworthiness-oriented evaluation across utility, safety, stability, smoothness, and fairness.

3.3 Reward Design and RL Optimization

To optimize for both utility and market trustworthiness, the step reward implements a series of penalties (Figure 2):

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= M_t - \lambda_d D_t - \lambda_j J_t - \lambda_u U_t - \lambda_p \Phi_t - \lambda_f F_t, \\ \Phi_t &= V_t + A_t, \quad A_t = \beta_t X_t. \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

The positive term M_t rewards successful market clearing. The corresponding penalties address liquidity drawdown (D_t), action jitter (J_t), unmet demand (U_t), composite physics risk (Φ_t), and spatial unfairness across cities (F_t). Here, Φ_t combines the normalized physics violation rate V_t and the action-backed suspicious supply amount A_t .

The RL policies are trained using Stable-Baselines3. The benchmark incorporates three learned controllers with distinct optimization biases: PPO for stable on-policy updates, SAC for entropy-guided continuous exploration, and DQN for discrete Q-value learning. For instance, DQN optimizes the following target over the discretized action grid:

$$y_t = R_t + \gamma \max_{a'} Q_{\bar{\theta}}(s_{t+1}, a'). \quad (7)$$

Static, random, and myopic controllers are also evaluated as non-learning baselines to provide a comparison.

3.4 LLM Planner/Auditor Layer

To evaluate whether agentic oversight improves deployment-time safety, we introduce an AI-agent governance layer powered by LLMs, as shown in Figure 3. We insert this layer between the trained RL policy (e.g., PPO, SAC, DQN) and the market environment. This layer is active only during evaluation and is never used during RL

training. This separation ensures that any observed safety improvement stems from deployment-time guardrails rather than from reward shaping, policy retraining, or parameter updates.

The governance layer consists of two components: a Planner and an Auditor.

The Planner operates at the episode level. At the start of each 24-hour episode, it reviews episode-level context, including supply-demand adequacy, physics-risk statistics, static-market slippage, and benchmark action constraints. Based on this context, the Planner establishes admissible bounds for the RL action components, namely the reward ratio α_t , liquidity ratio ℓ_t , and burn rate b_t . It also outputs an episode-specific audit policy, including risk thresholds, a maximum audit budget B_e , a target audit rate, and a minimum cooldown length c_e . At each hourly step, the RL policy's proposed action is first decoded into market variables and clipped by the Planner-defined bounds and benchmark constraints, yielding a bounded action $\bar{a}_t$.

The Auditor provides sparse step-level oversight. Instead of reviewing every action, it is invoked only when risk signals indicate possible safety or market-integrity failures. To avoid notational conflict with the reward terms in Eq. (6), we denote the audit-side action-instability signal by κ_t . It is computed as the ℓ_1 distance between the current bounded action and the previous executed action:

$$\kappa_t = \|\bar{a}_t - a_{t-1}\|_1. \quad (8)$$

We further define the audit-side normalized supply-demand gap as

$$\Delta_t^{audit} = \frac{G_t^v - Q_t^d}{\max(Q_t^d, \epsilon)}, \quad (9)$$




Figure 3: Interaction between the reinforcement learning layer and the AI-agent governance layer. The RL policy proposes market actions, which are bounded by the Planner and conditionally revised by the Auditor under high-risk scenarios.

where G_t^v denotes verified energy supply, Q_t^d denotes market demand/load, and $\epsilon > 0$ avoids division by zero. Negative values of Δ_t^{audit} indicate supply shortfall.

Audit triggers are divided into hard and soft categories. Hard triggers respond to immediate safety or market-integrity threats, including excessive physical violation rate v_t , supply shortfall Δ_t^{audit} , and high static-market slippage σ_t :

$$H_t = \mathbb{I} [v_t > \tau_v \vee \Delta_t^{audit} < \tau_\Delta \vee \sigma_t > \tau_\sigma]. \quad (10)$$

Soft triggers capture erratic controller behavior through action instability:

$$S_t = \mathbb{I} [\kappa_t > \tau_\kappa]. \quad (11)$$

An action becomes audit-eligible when either trigger fires:

$$E_t = H_t \vee S_t. \quad (12)$$

To prevent excessive LLM intervention, soft-triggered audits are rate-limited by the episode budget and cooldown. In contrast, hard triggers bypass these limits due to their severity. Let $N_{e,t}^{audit}$ denote the number of audits already used in episode e before step t , and let t_e^{last} denote the most recent audited step. The final audit decision is

$$\mathbb{I}_t^{audit} = E_t \wedge \left[H_t \vee \left(N_{e,t}^{audit} < B_e \wedge t - t_e^{last} > c_e \right) \right]. \quad (13)$$

Thus, severe physics or market failures can trigger immediate review, while softer instability signals are subject to sparse intervention limits.

If $\mathbb{I}_t^{audit} = 0$, the market directly executes the bounded action $\bar{a}_t$. If $\mathbb{I}_t^{audit} = 1$, the Auditor receives the current observation, the bounded proposed action, the previous action, the Planner policy, and recent market diagnostics. It then returns a decision: approve, which keeps $\bar{a}_t$, or revise, which replaces it with a conservative corrected action. The wrapper deterministically applies this decision before calling the environment step.

Finally, to make the governance layer auditable and economically valid, all LLM outputs must follow structured schemas and numerical validation (Appendix B: Table 9). Planner outputs are clipped to valid benchmark action ranges and audit-policy ranges. Auditor outputs are sanitized against market constraints, including individual bounds on α_t , ℓ_t , and b_t , as well as the global allocation constraint $\alpha_t + \ell_t \leq 0.98$. This schema-enforced interface prevents free-form text from directly controlling market execution and ensures that every agentic intervention remains traceable and reproducible during evaluation.

3.5 Evaluation Metrics

SolarChain-Eval evaluates each policy from two perspectives: market utility and system trustworthiness. We compare six baselines: Static, Random, Myopic, PPO, SAC, and DQN. Static uses fixed governance parameters, Random samples actions uniformly, and Myopic follows a greedy rule based on current supply, demand, and risk signals. PPO and SAC operate in the continuous action space, while DQN uses the discretized action grid.

We use three evaluation settings:

- **Main Benchmark:** evaluates all baselines using the full reward in Eq. (6). This setting tests whether RL policies can improve utility while maintaining safety, stability, smoothness, and fairness.
- **Reward Ablation:** removes the physics penalty from Eq. (6), while still logging physical violations. This setting tests whether agents exploit unsafe generation when physical risk is not penalized.
- **Agentic Evaluation:** adds the AI-agent governance layer to trained RL policies during evaluation. This setting tests whether LLM-based oversight can revise unsafe actions without retraining the RL controller.




Figure 4: Main benchmark performance under the physics-constrained reward.




Figure 5: Trustworthiness metrics in the main benchmark. Translucent points are individual rollouts.

Table 3: Trustworthiness-oriented evaluation dimensions and reported evidence.

Dimension	Reported Evidence
Utility	Cumulative reward, episode trading volume
Physics Safety	Physics violation rate, artificial liquidity
Market Stability	Liquidity drawdown, token drawdown, slippage
Action Smoothness	Action jitter across hourly decisions
Spatial Fairness	City-level reward allocation imbalance
Auditability (Agentic)	Plan validity, audit rate, revision rate, action delta

4 Evaluation

Our empirical evaluation addresses the research questions using data aggregated across three independent seeds. We benchmark three agentic policies (PPO+LLM, SAC+LLM, DQN+LLM) against six non-agentic baselines (PPO, SAC, DQN, Static, Random, Myopic). The evaluation dataset (Appendix B) comprises 1,620 episode-level records, 38,880 hourly actions, 194,400 hourly state records, and 12,960 LLM governance log entries.

4.1 Benchmark Performance

We first evaluate the RL policies against three baseline models (Static, Random, Myopic) for market governance. To assess trustworthiness comprehensively, Table 4 reports utility, physical consistency, and market-execution metrics simultaneously. Results indicate that learned RL control provides a clear advantage over non-RL baselines. Across 90 rollouts per policy, the RL policies achieve a higher mean cumulative reward than the static, random, and myopic baselines (-22.61 vs. -23.97 ; Welch’s t -test, $p < 10^{-28}$). This improvement is primarily driven by continuous-control methods, as both PPO and SAC outperform all baselines ($p < 10^{-6}$ for all pairwise tests). Notably, these non-RL baselines are non-trivial: they represent stable governance rules (static), pure action-space exploration (random), and local rationality (myopic). Their underperformance suggests that effective market governance requires adaptive RL rather than rigid or one-step heuristics.


However, trustworthiness metrics reveal a complex utility-safety tradeoff. While SAC achieves the highest cumulative reward and trading volume alongside the lowest physics violation rate, it suffers from the highest mean slippage among the RL policies. Conversely,

Table 4: Main benchmark performance under the physics-constrained reward. Values are mean $\pm$ standard deviation over all three seeds and 90 rollouts per policy. Higher cumulative reward and trading volume are better; lower physics violation, slippage, and artificial liquidity indicate safer market governance.


Policy	Cumulative Reward	Trading Volume	Physics Violation Rate	Mean Slippage	Artificial Liquidity
Static	-23.38 ± 0.80	0.514 ± 0.099	0.4874 ± 0.0166	0.0140 ± 0.0020	0.1803 ± 0.0419
Random	-25.46 ± 0.91	0.480 ± 0.093	0.4771 ± 0.0172	0.0148 ± 0.0023	0.1137 ± 0.0297
Myopic	-23.08 ± 0.80	0.456 ± 0.088	0.4779 ± 0.0168	0.0144 ± 0.0023	0.1009 ± 0.0235
PPO	-22.35 ± 1.02	0.470 ± 0.097	0.4520 ± 0.0219	0.0134 ± 0.0023	0.1453 ± 0.0840
SAC	-22.26 ± 0.94	0.521 ± 0.100	0.4461 ± 0.0196	0.0178 ± 0.0032	0.0686 ± 0.0328
DQN	-23.23 ± 0.91	0.491 ± 0.096	0.4688 ± 0.0182	0.0148 ± 0.0023	0.1298 ± 0.0397

Table 5: Paired without-constraints deltas with and without the LLM governance layer. Each row uses 90 paired rollouts across three seeds. Positive Δ reward indicates that removing the physics penalty increases scalar utility; positive Δ violation or artificial liquidity indicates increased safety risk.


Governance	Policy	Δ Reward	Δ Physics Violation	Δ Artificial Liquidity	Δ Slippage
RL	PPO	22.61 ± 1.10	0.0311 ± 0.0084	0.0785 ± 0.0678	-0.0012 ± 0.0010
RL	SAC	22.52 ± 1.01	0.0412 ± 0.0095	0.1238 ± 0.0386	-0.0041 ± 0.0017
RL	DQN	23.55 ± 0.91	0.0182 ± 0.0101	0.0576 ± 0.0317	-0.0018 ± 0.0014
RL+LLM	PPO	22.67 ± 1.17	0.0225 ± 0.0107	0.0598 ± 0.0631	-0.0011 ± 0.0016
RL+LLM	SAC	22.62 ± 0.96	0.0344 ± 0.0102	0.1149 ± 0.0388	-0.0038 ± 0.0017
RL+LLM	DQN	23.78 ± 0.88	0.0081 ± 0.0079	0.0413 ± 0.0317	-0.0015 ± 0.0018



(a) Paired without-constraints artificial-liquidity deltas for RL and RL+LLM.



(b) Artificial liquidity across RL, RL+LLM, and their without-constraints ablations.



(c) Episode-wise artificial-liquidity trajectories for all four learned-agent settings.

Figure 6: Ablation experiment of physics constraints. Translucent points are rollout-level or paired-rollout observations.

PPO offers the lowest slippage but generates more artificial liquidity. DQN improves upon random control but fails to consistently outperform the myopic baseline, illustrating that RL architecture choice is critical for fine-grained control tasks. Consequently, these patterns expose an evaluation frontier. For rigorous trustworthiness evaluation, maximizing reward does not guarantee a safe policy if the gain introduces market friction or lacks physical backing. Figure 4 illustrates this frontier, showing the distinct operational trade-offs and residual variability within each policy type.

The metric decomposition in Figure 5 further unpacks this frontier. Although RL policies reduce overall physics violations compared to non-RL baselines, the underlying risk is redistributed

across artificial liquidity and slippage. SAC excels at physical credibility, whereas PPO prioritizes slippage control.

4.2 Ablation Experiment of Physics Constraints

The ablation study investigates the necessity of adding physical constraints to our RL and AI agent models. We examine four configurations: standard RL, RL without physics constraints, RL with LLM governance, and RL with LLM governance but lacking physics constraints. In the unconstrained settings, we remove the physics penalty from the reward function (Eq.6) while continuing to track physical violations and artificial liquidity. This design decouples the agent’s optimization objective from the benchmark’s safety

Table 6: Paired effects of adding the LLM Planner/Auditor layer under the physics-constrained reward. Δ columns are RL+LLM minus RL over 90 matched rollouts across three seeds; audit and revision rates are computed from 2,160 governance log steps per policy.

Policy	Δ Reward	Δ Action Jitter	Δ Artificial Liquidity	Δ Spatial Fairness	Audit Rate	Revision Rate
PPO	-0.094 ± 0.293	0.0223 ± 0.0154	-0.0074 ± 0.0216	0.0004 ± 0.0008	0.344	0.961
SAC	-0.062 ± 0.268	-0.0290 ± 0.0198	0.0073 ± 0.0110	0.0003 ± 0.0006	0.342	0.966
DQN	-0.277 ± 0.503	-0.0179 ± 0.0274	0.0109 ± 0.0252	-0.0002 ± 0.0021	0.372	0.958




Figure 7: Agentic governance diagnostics for the LLM Planner/Auditor layer. The panels combine summary auditability statistics, paired episode-level governance effects, and step-level audit traces.

diagnostics. Consequently, scalar reward maximization does not inherently equate to a better market outcome. If an agent boosts its reward by backing invalid supply and inflating apparent liquidity, the benchmark can explicitly expose it.

The empirical results in Table 5 demonstrate that removing the physics penalty inflates scalar rewards, but at the cost of severe safety risks. Under raw RL deployment, artificial liquidity surges by 0.0785, 0.1238, and 0.0576 MWh for PPO, SAC, and DQN, respectively. This failure mode persists even under RL+LLM deployment, where artificial liquidity still increases by 0.0598, 0.1149, and 0.0413 MWh. This illustrates a consistent shift toward higher artificial liquidity when constraints are ablated across both governance regimes (Figure 6a). Although the LLM layer mitigates the magnitude of these violations, it cannot eliminate the misalignment caused by a misspecified reward.

This comparison highlights the complementary roles of physical constraints and AI agent governance. While LLM governance audits actions post-hoc, physics-constrained RL embeds safety during optimization to prevent the exploitation of unviable liquidity. Aggregated across learned policies, mean artificial liquidity remains low in constrained environments (0.1146 MWh for RL; 0.1181 MWh for RL+LLM) but spikes in unconstrained settings (0.2012 MWh for RL; 0.1901 MWh for RL+LLM) (Figure 6b). Furthermore, this risk inflation is not an artifact of isolated rollouts, but a persistent behavioral trajectory woven throughout the evaluation episodes (Figure 6c). This confirms that unconstrained optimization remains riskier, even with active agentic oversight.

4.3 Evaluation of Agentic Layer


Having proven the function of physics constraints, we now evaluate the AI agent layer’s capacity for verifiable oversight. By analyzing transparent audit traces from market execution, we assess the system’s effectiveness as an auditable risk-control interface. This evaluation specifically quantifies intervention triggers, the magnitude of action modifications, and the underlying rationales for these corrections.

To investigate the reliability of the AI agent mechanism, Table 6 presents metrics derived from 12,960 step-level governance logs (encompassing three seeds, two constraint settings, and three learned policies). The system demonstrates exceptional reliability, with a Planner validity of 1.0 across all configurations. Notably, the evaluation reveals that effective oversight is highly selective rather than continuous. Under the physics-constrained setting, the Auditor intervenes in 34.2%–37.2% of steps, whereas in the unconstrained setting, the intervention rate is 27.3%–29.7%. The Auditor revises proposed actions in over 95% of cases under constraints, and over 83% without constraints.

The empirical results suggest that agentic governance functions as an auditable risk-control interface rather than a universal performance optimizer. Its impact is highly dependent on the behavioral characteristics of the base RL policy. For instance (Figure 7a), the LLM layer successfully suppresses action jitter for SAC and DQN by 0.0290 and 0.0179, respectively. Conversely, it marginally increases PPO jitter by 0.0223, primarily due to more frequent clipping and targeted revisions of PPO’s proposed actions. Similar policy-dependent trade-offs emerge in artificial liquidity: oversight reduces it for PPO

Table 7: Representative LLM audit trace selected from `agentic_logs.jsonl`. The row records the market context, proposed RL action, audited final action, and action delta.

Field	Value
policy / setting	PPO / LLM No-physics
Episode and step	Episode 6, step 15, hour 15
Trigger context	raw violation 0.14; gap 1.97; static slippage 0.72
RL proposed action	$r=0.049, l=0.931, b=0.200$
Audited final action	$r=0.050, l=0.200, b=0.000$
Action delta	0.932
Auditor rationale	Violation rate exceeds audit threshold; tighten allocation to limit exposure to unsafe backed supply.

**Figure 8: Case-study audit trace for PPO under the LLM governance setting.**

(-0.0074 MWh) but slightly increases it for SAC ($+0.0073$ MWh) and DQN ($+0.0109$ MWh). Spatial fairness remains largely stable, with minimal deltas across all policies (Figure 7b).

These mixed outcomes reveal that researchers should not assume that deploying an LLM governance layer automatically resolves all safety risks. Instead, it must rigorously define the boundaries of such oversight. Within the decentralized energy market setting, *SolarChain-Eval* demonstrates that while the AI agent successfully intercepts unstable decisions, as evidenced by the positive correlation between pre-audit action jitter and the corrective delta in Figure 7c, it cannot fully compensate for a misspecified RL reward. Ultimately, our findings advocate for a complementary approach to trustworthy autonomous systems. While agentic governance guarantees post-deployment transparency and event-driven risk mitigation, physically constrained RL optimization remains necessary to prevent reward-driven exploitation.

4.4 Case Study: Transparent LLM Audit Trace

To illustrate the transparency of our evaluation, we analyze a representative audit trace (Table 7). We select a scenario where the PPO agent operates without physical constraints, a setting where reward misspecification inherently encourages risky market behavior. At the evaluated step, environmental risk signals are elevated, including a raw physics violation rate of 0.14 and a supply gap of 1.97.

Driven by economic utility, the RL policy proposes an aggressive, high-liquidity action ($r = 0.049, l = 0.931, b = 0.200$). Recognizing the safety breach, the LLM Auditor intervenes and revises the action to a conservative bound ($r = 0.050, l = 0.200, b = 0.000$), resulting in a substantial action delta of 0.932 (Figure 8b). Beyond the numerical correction, the physical violation rate exceeded the safety threshold, necessitating a tighter liquidity allocation to limit exposure to unsafe supply.

This case validates the contribution of the agentic layer to trustworthy evaluation. *SolarChain-Eval* records the entire decision-making process. It explicitly documents the activating risk signals, the resulting action adjustments, and the auditor’s natural language rationale. By providing this transparency, *SolarChain-Eval* guarantees that autonomous interventions remain accountable after deployment.

5 Conclusion

In conclusion, we proposed *SolarChain-Eval*, a physics-constrained benchmark designed to evaluate the trustworthiness of economic agents in decentralized energy markets. Our empirical evaluations reveal a clear trade-off inherent in autonomous market governance. While RL policies improve economic utility relative to static and heuristic rules, they may compromise safety for market efficiency. This vulnerability is starkly exposed when physical constraints are removed: driven purely by reward maximization, an RL policy may exploit false data injection attacks to artificially inflate market liquidity. To counter this flaw, combining physical constraints with an AI-agent governance layer provides a structured and auditable safety interface. By evaluating context and intercepting high-risk decisions, the AI-agent layer creates transparent intervention traces and can mitigate instability patterns, although its corrective impact remains policy-dependent and bounded by the underlying RL controller.

The deployment of autonomous agents in cyber-physical systems requires evaluation paradigms that look beyond standard reward maximization. *SolarChain-Eval* addresses this gap by logging the complete decision loop, including environmental risk signals, action corrections, and natural language explanations. Consequently, our benchmark supports deployment-oriented stress tests in which agent behaviors remain economically viable, verifiable, accountable, and physically grounded.

Future work will make *SolarChain-Eval* broader and more diagnostic. We will test whether the utility–safety–stability–fairness–auditability template transfers to autonomous trading and supply-chain allocation by replacing the PV physics oracle with domain-specific feasibility or risk checks. We will also calibrate the simulator with broader meteorological and market traces and run sensitivity analyses over reward weights, FDIA frequency and severity, node scale, and market-clearing assumptions. For the Planner/Auditor, we will measure selectivity with safe-action holdouts, approval-only controls, false-positive and false-negative rates, and trigger-level ablations, separating meaningful risk detection from overly conservative defaults. Finally, we will compare *SolarChain-Eval* with constrained-RL and agentic-benchmark baselines to clarify when post-hoc governance helps and when reward misspecification must be addressed during training.

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A Formulas Implementation

This appendix lists some important equations used by the released *SolarChain-Eval* code but not separately expanded in the methodology section.

PV capacity and trust labels. The data generator converts weather into a physical PV upper bound and the loader derives the trust labels used by the benchmark:

$$\begin{aligned}
 I_{c,t} &= \mathbb{I}[z_{c,t} < 90^\circ] \min\{\max(S_{c,t}, 0), 1.08 \max(C_{c,t}, 0)\}, \\
 \eta_{i,t}^{temp} &= \text{clip}\{1 + \gamma_i(T_{c,t} - 25), 0.78, 1.08\}, \\
 P_{i,t}^{max} &= \max\{0, I_{c,t} A_i \eta_{i,t}^{temp}\}, \\
 G_{i,t}^v &= \mathbb{I}[\text{status}_{i,t} = \text{verified}] P_{i,t}^{reported}, \\
 X_{i,t}^{excess} &= \max(P_{i,t}^{reported} - P_{i,t}^{max}, 0), \\
 \text{viol}_{i,t} &= \mathbb{I}[X_{i,t}^{excess} > 10^{-6} \vee \text{FDIA}_{i,t}], \\
 R_{i,t}^{rejected} &= \text{viol}_{i,t} P_{i,t}^{reported}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Action decoding and allocation budget. Continuous policy outputs are decoded into governance ratios and then sanitized against the global allocation budget:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \alpha_t &= \alpha_{\min} + u_{t,1}(\alpha_{\max} - \alpha_{\min}), \\
 \ell_t &= \ell_{\min} + u_{t,2}(\ell_{\max} - \ell_{\min}), \\
 b_t &= u_{t,3} b_{\max}, \\
 s_t &= \min\left\{1, \frac{0.98}{\alpha_t + \ell_t}\right\}, \\
 (\alpha_t, \ell_t) &\leftarrow (s_t \alpha_t, s_t \ell_t).
 \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

DQN uses the same decoder after selecting one point from a $5^3 = 125$ normalized action grid.

Unsafe supply, artificial liquidity, and market clearing. The implementation records how much invalid supply is economically backed and how much liquidity it creates:

$$\begin{aligned}
 X_t &= \max\left\{\sum_i R_{i,t}^{rejected}, \sum_i X_{i,t}^{excess}, \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \max\left(\sum_i P_{i,t}^{reported} - \sum_i P_{i,t}^{max}, 0\right)\right\}, \\
 \beta_t &= \frac{\min(\alpha_t + \ell_t, 0.98)}{0.98}, \\
 A_t^{unsafe} &= \beta_t X_t, \\
 G_t^{backed} &= G_t^v + A_t^{unsafe}, \\
 A_t^{artificial} &= \ell_t A_t^{unsafe}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

The executed market transition is then

$$\begin{aligned}
 \tilde{Q}_t &= Q_t^d \max(0.75, 1 - 0.80 b_t), \\
 L_t^{avail} &= L_t + \ell_t G_t^{backed}, \\
 M_t &= \min(L_t^{avail}, \tilde{Q}_t), \\
 L_{t+1} &= \max(L_t^{avail} - M_t, 0), \\
 \sigma_t^{exec} &= \frac{\tilde{Q}_t}{\max(L_t^{avail} + 0.05, 0.05)}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Episode, fairness, and audit metrics. The evaluation code aggregates step records into rollout-level metrics:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_e &= \sum_{t \in e} R_t, \\
 V_e &= \frac{1}{24} \sum_{t \in e} V_t, \\
 J_e &= \frac{1}{23} \sum_{t=2}^{24} \|a_t - a_{t-1}\|_1, \\
 \bar{\sigma}_e &= \frac{1}{24} \sum_{t \in e} \sigma_t^{exec}, \\
 A_e^{artificial} &= \sum_{t \in e} A_t^{artificial}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

City-level reward imbalance and agentic intervention strength are reported as

$$\begin{aligned}
 F_e &= \frac{\text{Var}_c\left(\sum_{t \in e} r_{c,t}^{city}\right)}{\max\left(\frac{1}{|C|} \sum_c \left|\sum_{t \in e} r_{c,t}^{city}\right|, 10^{-9}\right)}, \\
 \delta_t &= \|a_t^{final} - a_t^{original}\|_1, \\
 \text{audit_rate} &= \frac{N_{audit}}{24}, \\
 \text{revision_rate} &= \frac{N_{revise}}{\max(N_{audit}, 1)}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

B Data Provenance and Evaluation Matrix

Table 8 summarizes the benchmark input data used in this paper and documents the provenance of each raw file before policy evaluation. The primary dataset is a benchmark instance covering Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou from 2026-04-01 to 2026-05-01. It contains 720 hourly timestamps and integrates cached city-level weather, node-level PV parameters, reported generation records, FDIA and verification labels, aggregate market-liquidity states, and generated P2P transaction traces.

The evaluation artifacts reported in the paper are derived from these raw inputs through a fixed evaluation pipeline. The stored evidence records outcomes at multiple granularities, including episode-level metrics for rollout rewards and safety outcomes, hourly action rows for executed policy decisions, city-hour policy rows for spatial market states, violation, and fairness calculations, and LLM governance logs for Planner/Auditor decisions. Overall, the evaluation matrix contains 1,620 episode-level metric rows, 38,880 hourly action rows, 194,400 city-hour policy rows, and 12,960 LLM governance log rows.

Table 8: Raw benchmark data files and collection or generation methods. Row counts exclude CSV headers.

File	Rows	Key fields	Collection or generation method
open_meteo_weather.json	5 city payloads	hourly time, temperature, short-wave radiation, latitude, longitude, timezone	Retrieved by generate_monthly_datasets.py from the Open-Meteo Historical Weather API for Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Shenzhen, and Hangzhou; cached locally and reused on later runs.
urban_energy_nodes.csv	50	node id, city, latitude, longitude, panel area, efficiency, temperature coefficient, install date	Generated with seed 20260511: 10 nodes per city, coordinates jittered around city centers, panel areas sampled from 18–64 m ² , efficiencies from 0.176–0.226, temperature coefficients from -0.0046 to -0.0032, and install dates from 2020-01-01 to 2024-05-31.
spatiotemporal_generation.csv	36,000	timestamp, node id, city, irradiance, air temperature, P^{max} , reported power, FDIA flag, verification status	Generated hourly for 50 nodes over 720 hours from cached weather, pvlib clear-sky and solar-position calculations, node-specific PV parameters, inverter derate, and noise. Exactly 1,800 rows are FDIA-injected and marked rejected.
market_liquidity.csv	720	timestamp, total verified MW, SolarChain liquidity, baseline liquidity, SolarChain slippage, baseline slippage	Aggregated from verified generation. The implementation uses $L^{SC} = 0.92G^v + 0.018$, $L^{base} = 0.61G^v + 0.008$, $\sigma^{SC} = 0.18/(L^{SC} + 0.045)$, and $\sigma^{base} = 0.31/(L^{base} + 0.028)$.
p2p_trades.csv	1,185	trade id, timestamp, factory id, city, energy purchased, tokens burned, exergy dissipated	Generated for daylight hours with positive verified supply. Each active hour can create up to three factory purchases; purchase size is the minimum of a SolarChain-liquidity share and a verified-generation share, with token burn and exergy fields sampled from configured multipliers.

Table 9: Reproducibility protocol for the LLM Planner/Auditor layer.

Component	Specification
LLM configuration	Both Planner and Auditor use a fixed model, ChatGPT 5.5 mini, specified before evaluation and held constant across seeds, policies, episodes, and steps. The LLM is used only at evaluation time and is not involved in RL training.
Prompting	Planner and Auditor use fixed system/user prompt templates released with the code. The templates are unchanged across runs; only the episode-level or step-level context is substituted into the prompt.
Planner output schema	The Planner is called once per episode and must return governance_mode, action_bounds, audit_policy, and rationale. Bounds cover α_t , ℓ_t , and b_t ; the audit policy specifies trigger thresholds, budget, target audit rate, and cooldown.
Auditor output schema	The Auditor is called only for scheduler-eligible steps and must return decision, final_action, risk_assessment, and reason. The decision is restricted to approve or revise.
Decoding and validation	Structured-output parsing is used first; the chat JSON-schema fallback uses temperature=0. All outputs are parsed by strict schemas with extra fields forbidden. Valid numerical outputs are clipped and sanitized to benchmark constraints, including $\alpha_t + \ell_t \leq 0.98$.
Failure handling	Missing, unparsable, or schema-invalid LLM outputs fail the LLM evaluation run rather than being silently executed or replaced by free-form text.
Execution and logging	Execution depends only on validated structured fields: approve keeps the bounded RL action, while revise executes the validated final_action. Natural-language rationales are logged for audit evidence but do not control execution.
Determinism and baseline	RL and environment seeds are fixed, but hosted LLM calls are not assumed to be bitwise deterministic. All accepted Planner/Auditor outputs are logged. A rule-based Planner/Auditor baseline uses the same scheduler, sanitizer, budget, cooldown, and logging interface.

Table 10: Detailed main-setting episode summaries. Reward, volume, violation, artificial liquidity, slippage, and action jitter are aggregated over 90 rollouts per policy.

Policy	Rollouts	Reward Mean	Reward Min	Reward Max	Volume	Violation Mean	Violation Range	Artificial Liquidity
DQN	90	-23.23	-24.97	-21.00	0.491	0.4688	0.4270–0.5048	0.1298
Myopic	90	-23.08	-24.60	-21.39	0.456	0.4779	0.4434–0.5136	0.1009
PPO	90	-22.35	-24.20	-20.14	0.470	0.4520	0.4060–0.4912	0.1453
Random	90	-25.46	-27.34	-23.28	0.480	0.4771	0.4395–0.5147	0.1137
SAC	90	-22.26	-24.28	-20.15	0.521	0.4461	0.4083–0.4879	0.0686
Static	90	-23.38	-24.86	-21.65	0.514	0.4874	0.4527–0.5218	0.1803

Table 11: Four-setting summaries for learned policies. Each row aggregates 90 rollouts across three seeds. These values support the paired physics-removal deltas and show how the LLM governance layer changes the setting-level risk profile.

Setting	Policy	Rollouts	Reward	Violation	Artificial Liquidity	Slippage	Jitter	Fairness
RL	PPO	90	-22.35	0.4520	0.1453	0.0134	0.0607	0.0041
RL	SAC	90	-22.26	0.4461	0.0686	0.0178	0.1435	0.0048
RL	DQN	90	-23.23	0.4688	0.1298	0.0148	0.1118	0.0159
RL+LLM	PPO	90	-22.44	0.4571	0.1379	0.0141	0.0829	0.0045
RL+LLM	SAC	90	-22.32	0.4527	0.0759	0.0175	0.1145	0.0051
RL+LLM	DQN	90	-23.51	0.4780	0.1406	0.0146	0.0939	0.0157
RL no-physics	PPO	90	0.27	0.4831	0.2238	0.0122	0.0135	0.0053
RL no-physics	SAC	90	0.26	0.4874	0.1925	0.0137	0.0432	0.0109
RL no-physics	DQN	90	0.32	0.4869	0.1874	0.0129	0.0259	0.0119
RL+LLM no-physics	PPO	90	0.22	0.4796	0.1977	0.0130	0.0366	0.0055
RL+LLM no-physics	SAC	90	0.30	0.4870	0.1908	0.0137	0.0362	0.0109
RL+LLM no-physics	DQN	90	0.27	0.4862	0.1820	0.0132	0.0342	0.0119

Table 12: Aggregate learned-policy means by setting. Each row averages PPO, SAC, and DQN over the same 270 rollouts. The no-physics settings remain substantially higher in artificial liquidity even when LLM governance is active.

Setting	Reward	Violation	Artificial Liquidity	Slippage	Jitter	Fairness
RL	-22.61	0.4557	0.1146	0.0153	0.1053	0.0083
RL+LLM	-22.76	0.4626	0.1181	0.0154	0.0971	0.0084
RL no-physics	0.28	0.4858	0.2012	0.0129	0.0275	0.0094
RL+LLM no-physics	0.26	0.4843	0.1901	0.0133	0.0357	0.0094

Table 13: Detailed LLM governance operation rates. Each row aggregates 2,160 agentic log steps from three seeds. The LLM failure count is zero for every row and is therefore not shown.

Setting	Policy	Steps	Audit Rate	Revision Given Audit	Modification Rate	Mean Action Δ	Not Triggered
Main	DQN	2160	0.372	0.958	0.518	0.084	0.488
Main	PPO	2160	0.344	0.961	0.987	0.164	0.550
Main	SAC	2160	0.342	0.966	0.524	0.059	0.509
No-physics	DQN	2160	0.297	0.892	0.490	0.042	0.683
No-physics	PPO	2160	0.273	0.832	0.991	0.111	0.691
No-physics	SAC	2160	0.274	0.876	0.294	0.021	0.698

Table 14: Detailed LLM post-hoc trigger diagnostics and mean Planner thresholds. Trigger columns report the fraction of logged steps satisfying each trigger condition.

Setting	Policy	Physics Trig.	Gap Trig.	Slippage Trig.	Jitter Trig.	Viol. Thr.	Gap Thr.	Jitter Thr.	Slip Thr.
Main	DQN	0.120	0.440	0.168	0.230	0.141	-0.108	0.177	2.960
Main	PPO	0.121	0.440	0.171	0.171	0.142	-0.112	0.174	2.961
Main	SAC	0.120	0.441	0.137	0.211	0.142	-0.102	0.175	3.061
No-physics	DQN	0.116	0.441	0.170	0.049	0.143	-0.099	0.170	3.028
No-physics	PPO	0.113	0.441	0.126	0.078	0.144	-0.103	0.185	3.140
No-physics	SAC	0.105	0.441	0.145	0.048	0.146	-0.102	0.181	3.111

Table 15: Paired episode-level effects of adding the LLM Planner/Auditor layer. Deltas are computed as RL+LLM minus raw RL under matched seed, policy, and episode.

Comparison	Policy	Δ Reward	Δ Action Jitter	Δ Spatial Fairness	Δ Artificial Liquidity	Δ Slippage
Main	DQN	-0.277 ± 0.503	-0.0179 ± 0.0274	-0.0002	0.0109	-0.0001
Main	PPO	-0.094 ± 0.293	0.0223 ± 0.0154	0.0004	-0.0074	0.0007
Main	SAC	-0.062 ± 0.268	-0.0290 ± 0.0198	0.0003	0.0073	-0.0003
No-physics	DQN	-0.045 ± 0.065	0.0083 ± 0.0110	0.0000	-0.0054	0.0002
No-physics	PPO	-0.043 ± 0.097	0.0231 ± 0.0166	0.0002	-0.0261	0.0008
No-physics	SAC	0.038 ± 0.089	-0.0070 ± 0.0154	0.0000	-0.0017	0.0000

Table 16: Step-level action distributions for learned policies. Each cell reports mean with 5th–95th percentile range in parentheses.

Setting	Policy	Reward Ratio	Liquidity Ratio	Burn Rate
Main	DQN	0.320 (0.050–0.500)	0.517 (0.200–0.762)	0.081 (0.000–0.150)
Main	PPO	0.050 (0.049–0.050)	0.401 (0.200–0.931)	0.104 (0.000–0.200)
Main	SAC	0.169 (0.058–0.432)	0.433 (0.212–0.738)	0.008 (0.001–0.028)
No-physics	DQN	0.216 (0.049–0.308)	0.759 (0.672–0.931)	0.080 (0.000–0.200)
No-physics	PPO	0.049 (0.049–0.050)	0.850 (0.200–0.931)	0.045 (0.000–0.200)
No-physics	SAC	0.215 (0.079–0.363)	0.764 (0.617–0.898)	0.011 (0.002–0.025)
LLM Main	DQN	0.321 (0.050–0.500)	0.575 (0.250–0.762)	0.070 (0.000–0.150)
LLM Main	PPO	0.065 (0.050–0.124)	0.480 (0.250–0.900)	0.071 (0.000–0.150)
LLM Main	SAC	0.166 (0.060–0.402)	0.470 (0.250–0.747)	0.009 (0.001–0.027)
LLM No-physics	DQN	0.217 (0.050–0.350)	0.746 (0.500–0.900)	0.069 (0.000–0.150)
LLM No-physics	PPO	0.062 (0.050–0.100)	0.799 (0.250–0.900)	0.028 (0.000–0.150)
LLM No-physics	SAC	0.212 (0.083–0.343)	0.764 (0.634–0.888)	0.011 (0.002–0.025)